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Item No: 17966

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CONTROLS

~~SECRET NOFORN WINTTEL~~
SECTION 003 OF 004

BODY:

SUBJ: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN EURASIA, NO. 35, DI-2680-348I-92 (U)
WITHDRAWALS AND FORCE
REDUCTIONS) GEN-COL BORIS GROMOV 30 JUN 1992
(B) (U) GENERAL STAFF MAIN DIRECTORATES:
CHIEF, MAIN OPERATIONS
DIRECTORATE GEN-LT VIKTOR BARYNKIN 21 AUG 1992
CHIEF, MAIN INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATE GEN-LT FYODOR LADYGIN 26 AUG 1992
CHIEF, MAIN ORGANIZATION
AND MOBILIZATION
DIRECTORATE GEN-LT VITALIY BOLOGOV 21 AUG 1992
(C) (U) SERVICE COMPONENT CINCS:
CINC, STRATEGIC MISSILE
FORCES GEN-COL IGOR SERGEYEV 21 AUG 1992
CINC, GROUND FORCES GEN-COL VLADIMIR SEMENOV 21 AUG 1992
CINC, AIR DEFENSE FORCES GEN-COL VIKTOR PRUDNIKOV 21 AUG 1992
CINC, AIR FORCES GEN-COL PETR DEYNEKIN 13 AUG 1992
CINC, NAVY ADM FELIKS GROMOV 21 AUG 1992
(D) (U) REGIONAL COMMANDS:
COMMANDER, FAR EAST
MILITARY DISTRICT (MD) GEN-COL VIKTOR CHECHEVATOV 19 MAY 1992
COMMANDER, LENINGRAD MD GEN-COL SERGEY SELEZNEV 7 DEC 1991
COMMANDER, MOSCOW MD GEN-COL LEONTIY KUZNETSOV 22 JUL 1992
COMMANDER, NORTH CAUCACUS
MD GEN-COL LEV SHUSTKO 17 OCT 1986

(4) ~~(S)~~ SINCE THE PEACEKEEPERS ARE THE FIRST UKRAINIAN MILITARY UNIT EVER DEPLOYED ABROAD, KIEV IS CLOSELY WATCHING AND EVALUATING THEIR COMBAT PERFORMANCE. OFFICIAL REPORTS HAVE STATED THAT UNIT MORALE REMAINS HIGH DESPITE RECEIVING CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THE TROOPS ARE FRUSTRATED OVER THEIR INABILITY TO RETURN FIRE WHEN SUBJECTED TO ARTILLERY SHELLING. NEVERTHELESS, THE UNIT'S SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT TO BOSNIA DEMONSTRATES THAT UKRAINE'S DEVELOPING ARMY HAS A PROFESSIONAL LEVEL OF MILITARY PROFICIENCY.

(5) ~~(S)~~ DESPITE GOVERNMENT DEMANDS THAT THE UN PROVIDE BETTER PROTECTION, UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPERS WILL CONTINUE TO SERVE THE REMAINING 3, 1/2 MONTHS OF THEIR 6, MONTH STINT. HOWEVER, IF THE UN MISSION WERE TO CHANGE FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEMAKING (REQUIRING DIRECT COMBAT), THE UNIT WOULD PROBABLY BE WITHDRAWN, SINCE KIEV WOULD BE UNWILLING TO RISK SIGNIFICANT UKRAINIAN CASUALTIES IN FIGHTING FELLOW SLAVS.

(6) (U) UKRAINE'S UN PEACEKEEPING BATTALION

(A) ~~(S)~~ UKRAINE'S PEACEKEEPING BATTALION COMPRISES ELEMENTS OF THE 93D MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION AT VOLNOYE, UKRAINE. THE UNIT IS ORGANIZED INTO A HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, A RADAR SECTION, AND TWO LIGHT INFANTRY COMPANIES AND HAS APPROXIMATELY 450 PERSONNEL. IT IS EQUIPPED WITH APPROXIMATELY 30 BTR ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, TRUCKS, MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY VEHICLES, AND COUNTERMORTAR/COUNTERARTILLERY RADARS. SOLDIERS ARE ARMED WITH SMALL ARMS AND MACHINEGUNS. THE UNIT LACKS ARTILLERY AND TANKS AND IS INCAPABLE OF RETURNING HOSTILE ARTILLERY FIRE OR ENGAGING IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HEAVIER EQUIPPED SERB FORCES.

(B) ~~(S/INT)~~ THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS REPORTEDLY HAD LITTLE TROUBLE RECRUITING SUFFICIENT VOLUNTEERS. THEY ARE EXTREMELY WELL PAID BY UKRAINIAN STANDARDS, RECEIVING THE EQUIVALENT OF \$500 PER MONTH. THE OFFICERS ARE PROFESSIONALS, TRAINED IN THE FORMER SOVIET ARMY, AND THE ENLISTED RANKS DO NOT CONTAIN ANY NEW RECRUITS. THE UKRAINIANS DO NOT HAVE A PROFESSIONAL NCO CORPS BUT RELY ON SELECTED CONSCRIPTS TO FILL THESE POSITIONS. WHILE ALL ETHNIC GROUPS LIVING IN UKRAINE ARE REPRESENTED IN THE UNIT, A MAJORITY OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL PROBABLY ARE ETHNIC UKRAINIANS.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

5. (U) ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

A. (U) START RATIFICATION: WAITING FOR GO.

(1) ~~(S)~~ THE UNITED STATES AND KAZAKHSTAN HAVE RATIFIED THE START TREATY. BYELARUS HAS INDICATED IT WILL PROBABLY RATIFY START BY NOVEMBER. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET HAS COMPLETED START RATIFICATION PREPARATIONS, RATIFICATION BY BOTH MOSCOW AND KIEV WILL PROBABLY BE DELAYED UNTIL UKRAINE RESOLVES A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT TREATY ISSUES.

(2) ~~(S)~~ THE U.S. SENATE RATIFIED THE START TREATY ON 1 OCTOBER; KAZAKHSTAN HAD EARLIER RATIFIED THE TREATY IN JULY. THE PROSPECTS FOR RAPID START RATIFICATION IN BYELARUS BY NOVEMBER DEPEND ON THE ABILITY OF THE SUPREME SOVIET TO FIRST RESOLVE OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ADOPTION OF A REVISED CONSTITUTION, WHEN IT MEETS IN LATE OCTOBER. POLITICAL WRANGLING OVER THESE ISSUES COULD POSTPONE RATIFICATION UNTIL LATER IN THE YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, BYELARUS HAS MAINTAINED STRONG SUPPORT FOR RATIFYING BOTH START AND

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). THE BILATERAL STRATEGIC FORCES AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH RUSSIA IN JULY RESTATED MINSK'S COMMITMENT TO ABIDE BY START PROVISIONS.

(3) ~~(S)~~ WHILE THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET HAS FINISHED PREPARATIONS FOR START RATIFICATION, SOME MEMBERS HAVE DEMANDED THAT UKRAINE FIRST RATIFY THE NPT AND THUS ENTER START AS A NONNUCLEAR NATION BEFORE RATIFYING START. THOUGH LESS LIKELY, SOME RUSSIANS HAVE PROPOSED PROMPTLY RATIFYING START BUT DELAYING EXCHANGING THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH KIEV.

(4) ~~(S)~~ FOR KIEV'S PART, ONGOING UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC DISPUTES OVER NUCLEAR POLICY WILL DELAY START RATIFICATION. PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OFFICIALLY SUPPORTS PROMPT RATIFICATION OF START, BUT A SMALL GROUP OF INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ACCESSION TO THE NPT AND RATIFICATION OF START. KIEV IS SEEKING SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AND A SHARE OF ANY PROFITS FROM THE SALE OF ENRICHED URANIUM FROM UKRAINIAN, DEPLOYED MISSILES, AS WELL AS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. COMPLICATING THE ISSUE IS KIEV'S COMMITMENT TO GAINING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES DEPLOYED IN UKRAINE.

(5) ~~(S)~~ START, STATUS OF RATIFICATION:
UNITED STATES RATIFIED 1 OCTOBER 1992.
KAZAKHSTAN RATIFIED 2 JULY 1992.
BYELARUS SUPREME SOVIET MEETS 20 OCTOBER TO CONSIDER
 RATIFICATION.
RUSSIA COMPLETED RATIFICATION PREPARATIONS; NEGOTIATIONS
 UNDER WAY WITH UKRAINE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING
 ISSUES.
UKRAINE WILL CONSIDER TREATY RATIFICATION BY END OF YEAR;
 OPPOSITION TO START AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
 INSTABILITY WILL MOST LIKELY DELAY RATIFICATION.

(6) ~~(S)~~ MOUNTING INTERNAL UKRAINIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES THREATEN TO DELAY START RATIFICATION. UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION IS KEY TO RUSSIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF START AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE START TREATY VERIFICATION MEASURES. UKRAINE'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO RATIFY START COULD PUT THE ENTIRE START PROCESS AT RISK AND JEOPARDIZE THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO FULLY MONITOR COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC FORCE COMPLIANCE WITH START PROVISIONS.

B. (U) DESTRUCTION OF COMMONWEALTH ICBM SILOS PICKS UP SPEED

(1) ~~(S/INT)~~ THE NUMBER OF SILOS THAT THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES/RUSSIA HAS DEACTIVATED AND DESTROYED SINCE AUGUST 1991 SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES RUSSIA'S START-ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHER TOTALS. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO REDUCES THE BURDEN OF ELIMINATING SILOS TO TREATY SPECIFICATIONS AND THUS DEFRAYS SOME POTENTIAL COSTS OF PROVIDING ONSITE INSPECTION SUPPORT.

(2) ~~(S/INT)~~ SHORTLY AFTER THE START TREATY WAS SIGNED ON 31 JULY 1991, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN SUBSTANTIAL ICBM SILO REDUCTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE, AS WELL AS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GAIN. WITH THE CONTINUING DELAYS IN THE START RATIFICATION PROCESS, HOWEVER, SILO DESTRUCTIONS LAGGED

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(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(7)(D)
USC 421

BEHIND DEACTIVATIONS AS THE RUSSIANS REMAINED AT OR NEAR THE SALT II LIMIT OF 1,398 ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHERS. FROM AUGUST 1991 UNTIL JUNE 1992, THE FORMER SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(3) (S//NF) SINCE JUNE, HOWEVER, A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN SILO DESTRUCTIONS HAS BEEN OBSERVED. THIS ACTIVITY SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES THE NUMBER OF DEACTIVATED SILOS AWAITING DESTRUCTION AND INDICATES PREPARATION FOR START IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS ASSOCIATED DATA EXCHANGE. SPECIFICALLY, (b)(1)

(b)(1) DESTRUCTION OF THESE SILOS IS ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE IT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHERS AND FACILITIES TO BE DECLARED IN THE DATA UPDATE EXCHANGE 30 DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE. (b)(1)

SINCE AT LEAST 22 ACCOUNTABLE SS-18 LAUNCHERS MUST BE ELIMINATED EACH YEAR ACCORDING TO THE TREATY, DESTRUCTION OF THESE DEACTIVATED SILOS WILL MOST LIKELY BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER START TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE.

(4) (S//NF) THE EARLY DEACTIVATIONS AND DESTRUCTIONS PROVIDE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR RUSSIA AND ALLOW A HEAD START FOR REDUCTIONS REQUIRED UNDER START. THESE EARLY DESTRUCTIONS REDUCE THE BURDEN OF ELIMINATING SILOS TO START TREATY-REQUIRED DEPTHS (EXPLOSION TO 6 METERS OR EXCAVATION TO 8 METERS), AND THEIR REMOVAL FROM THE START LIST OF FACILITIES IN AN OPERATIONAL STATUS REDUCES THE NEED FOR ONSITE INSPECTION. THE RUSSIANS ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF MEETING THE REQUIRED TREATY-MANDATED REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE 7-YEAR START DRAWDOWN PERIOD.

C. (U) RUSSIAN CFE GROUND FORCE DATA: ANOTHER REFLECTION OF THE CRUMBLING EMPIRE

(1) (S//NF) THE REDUCTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS OF RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES ARE REFLECTED IN THE NET DECREASE OF 94 OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION IN RUSSIA'S CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY DATA DECLARATION SINCE NOVEMBER 1990. FURTHER DECREASES IN RUSSIAN OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION, DISPUTES OVER OWNERSHIP, AND MILITARY, POLITICAL DISPUTES WILL REDUCE AND COMPLICATE NATO CFE ONSITE INSPECTIONS. (u)

(2)

(b)(1)

HOWEVER, A NET REDUCTION OF 94 OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION (OOVS)--BRIGADES, REGIMENTS, AND SEPARATE BATTALIONS OR STORAGE SITES THAT HOLD TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT AT SPECIFIED LOCATIONS--HAS OCCURRED IN THE RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES SINCE THE DATA SUBMISSION OF NOVEMBER 1990. THE DATA SHOW A NET REDUCTION OF 62 MANEUVER REGIMENT OOVS IN THE GROUND FORCES CLAIMED BY RUSSIA--37 OF THEM FROM THE WESTERN GROUP OF FORCES (GOF) IN GERMANY. THE FEW NET GAINS OF OOVS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS (MDS) REFLECT THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES BACK TO RUSSIA, WHERE THEY REPLACE DISBANDED UNITS.

(3) (U) CHANGES IN RUSSIAN GROUND FORCE OOVS SINCE 1990:

TABLE

	1992	MANEUVER	MANEUVER	ARTILLERY
	OOVS	REGIMENT	BATTALION	REGIMENT/ BRIGADE